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Deahl: Receiving Stolen Property - The Doctrine of Recent Possession and
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY-The Doctrine of Recent Possession and
Problems Associated with Defendant's Testimony, Russell v. State, 583
P.2d 690 (Wyo. 1978).

The crime of receiving stolen goods plays a crucial role
in deterring misappropriation of property by punishing the
person who provides pecuniary incentive to theft, the fence.'
Receiving, which was a creation of the legislature developed
to close gaps left by the common law doctrines of accomplice
liability,2 presents unique problems of proof to the prosecutor and unique perils for the defendant. It appears that
courts have dealt with the former by permitting inferences
which aid the prosecutor, while the latter have received less
consideration.
THE FACTS IN RUSSELL

On February 5, 1976, Thomas Russell, Jr. was arrested
by the police after he sold an intake manifold stolen from a
car at a garage for $50.00 in marked bills, and charged with
receiving stolen property. At his trial, the State produced
testimony indicating that the property was in fact that
stolen from the garage sometime between December 15,
1975, and January 20, 1976; that the new or replacement
value of the manifold was about $900; and that Karl
Hoskins, then owner of the auto from which the manifold
was taken, had been approached by one Charles Edwards,
who advised him that the defendant Russell had the
manifold. Hoskins testified that Russell later contacted him,
and that an exchange had been arranged with the knowledge
and cooperation of the local police department.
The defendant testified that he had received the
manifold from Edwards to secure a $34 loan, that he believed
the manifold to be worth about $200 at the time of receipt,
Copyright©1979 by the University of Wyoming
1. Walsh and Chappel, OperationalParametersin the Stolen Property System, 2 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113, 126-127 (1974).
2. HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 52-62 (2d ed. 1952).
3. WYo. STAT. § 6-7-304 (1977), providing that:
Whoever buys, receives, conceals, or aids in concealment of anything of value,
which has been stolen, embezzled, or obtained by false pretenses, knowing the same
to have been stolen, embezzled, or obtained by false pretenses, shall if the goods are
of the value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or upwards, suffer the punishment
prescribed for grand larceny, and if the goods are worth less than one hundred
dollars ($100.00) shall suffer the punishment prescribed for petit larceny.
WYO. STAT. §§ 6-7-301 and 6-7-302 (1977) prescribe a penalty of not more than
ten years for grand larceny and not more than six months for petit larceny, except
that a second conviction of petit larceny carries the same maximum as that for
grand larceny.
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and that Edwards had given him permission to sell in order
to liquidate the debt. However, he denied knowledge that the
property was stolen, although the State's evidence indicated
that he had told Hoskins at the exchange that the manifold
had come from Keith Spencer's car, the same vehicle that
Hoskins had in the interim purchased.
Edwards corroborated the defendant's testimony about
the loan, and further testified that he had originally received
the manifold from Hoskins for $50, and that Hoskins sought
its return after Edwards had transferred it to the defendant.
On rebuttal, the State produced a police officer and a
deputy county attorney, who both testified that Edwards
had told them that the foregoing was a fabrication conceived
of by the defendant and induced by threat, and that Russell
had in fact stolen the property himself. In a later trial, Edwards was convicted of perjury, and that conviction was affirmed on appeal.4
The jury returned a guilty verdict against Russell, who
appealed assigning error (1) to the trial court's failure to
grant his motion for acquittaP based on the insufficiency of
the State's evidence to present a prima facie case, (2) to the
refusal to grant a similar motion at the close of his defense,
and (3) to the general insufficiency of the evidence to support
a conviction based on guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court ruled that by introducing evidence of (1)
possession of (2) recently stolen property, the State had
made a prima facie case under the doctrine of recent possession. The Court also decided that the defendant's testimony
and the State's rebuttal supplied further substantive
evidence for the State, thus providing proof sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of guilt. The conviction was therefore
affirmed.
THE COURT'S REASONING

A.

The Doctrine of Recent Possession

The elements of receiving under Section 6-7-304 of the
Wyoming Statutes, as enumerated by the Court. are (1) the
4.
5.

Edwards v. State. 577 P,2d 1380 (Wvo. 1978).
Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 30(a). identical to FED. R. CRiM. PRO. 29(a).
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receipt (2) of a thing of value (3) knowing it to be stolen.6 It
was obvious that the first two elements were present, as (1)
Russell had been seen passing the property to Hoskins by
the police and Hoskins, and (2) the defendant had stipulated
to the stolen character of the manifold. 7 The problematic element, as in any receiving case, was the requirement that the
defendant know that the goods were stolen at the time of
receipt (scienter).8 To permit the jury to find this element on
the basis of the testimony adduced by the State, the Court
permitted the State to rely on what has been described as
"[a] presumption running through a dozen centuries," 9 the
substance of which is that proof by the State of (1) possession of (2) recently stolen property constitutes a prima facie
case for the required scienter, and if this possession is not explained to the jury's satisfaction, the jury may find the
defendant guilty of receiving."0
The Court observed that it could be argued that since
the effect of this permitted inference is to place a great deal
of pressure on the defendant to attempt an explanation of
his possession, this might result in a violation of his selfincrimination privilege under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 1 However, that contention, as the Court
pointed out, has been severely undercut by Barnes v. United
States, 2 upholding the doctrine in a case involving stolen
United States payroll checks against such a challenge, as
well as against due process clause objections.
The Russell Court inserted a caveat, however, that
"[nlaked possession" of property does not establish a prima
facie case, absent "[o]ther incriminating surrounding cir6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690, 693 (Wyo. 1978). Cf LAFAVE AND Scorr,-CRIM INAL
LAW 688 (1972), [hereinafter cited as LaFave and Scott], adding a fourth element.
"Some sort of a bad state of mind, in addition to guilty knowledge, is required."
Russell v. State, supra note 6, at 693.
Id. Note that the problem is actually that of concurrence between the elements of
receipt and knowledge. See, CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES 976 (7th ed. 1967):
LAFAVE AND ScoT, at 688-689.
THAYER. A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 327 (1898).

The defendant did not object to this instruction at trial. Russell v. State. supra note
6,at 15.
See, Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 536-537, in which the Supreme Court
applied the inference under the receiving provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (19641.
Russell v. State, supra note 6, at 696. See Note, Constitutionalityof Presumptions
on Receiving Stolen Property: Turning the Thumbscrews in Michigan and Other

12.

States, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1437. 1439 (1975), dealing with statutory presumptions of
this kind.
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 (1973). The Russell Court did not discuss
Wyoming's privilege against self-incrimination, WYo. CONST. Art. 1, § 11 - "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case."
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cumstances," citing in this case the value of the manifold,
the fact that the defendant told Hoskins that the manifold
was the stolen article, and the fact that the defendant had
concealed the marked money when arrested. 13
The dissenting opinion" vigorously contended that the
State's case in no way showed that the defendant knew the
property was stolen at the time of receipt, citing authorities
holding that the defendant must personally believe the res
stolen, and that mere failure to pursue an inquiry which
would lead to knowledge of the stolen character of the goods
would not suffice."
B.

False Exculpatory Statements

The majority ruled that "[tihe defendant's defense supplied further evidence of guilt and bolstered the State's
case,," relying on the defendant's testimony that he thought
the manifold worth $200 when he ostensibly received it as
collateral for the $34 loan, and more importantly, that Edwards' testimony, rebutted by the State, was a false exculpatory statement which was evidence of a consciousness
of guilt. 16

The dissent strenuously denied that any defense
testimony could be considered substantive evidence for the
State to meet its burden of proof, contending that such a rule
"[c]an only have a chilling effect" on a defendant's decision
to take the stand in his own defense.17
ANALYSIS

1.

Recent Possession Doctrine

As noted above, the inference permitted from possession is an ancient one, and is undoubtedly a response to the
fact that direct testimony'as to a defendant's mental state is
rarely available.'" In effect, this troublesome element is
eliminated unless the defendant can satisfactorily explain
13. Russell v. State, supra note 6. at 698.
14. Russell v. State, supra note 6, at 701.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 699.
17. Id. at 702-703.
18. LaFave and Scott, at 686.
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his possession.'9 The respectability of such an inference is
demonstrated by the enshrinement of a "presumption" in
the Model Penal Code, which is calculated to affect only persons with stolen property from two or more crimes, a prior
conviction of receiving, or dealers in the type of goods received who purchase them for a disproportionately low consideration."0
However, this inference is not the sole legal factor in
Russell. The Court's holding that the defendant's defense
bolstered the State's case adds a further dimension to the
problem of fact-finding.
2.

False Exculpatory Statements

The proposition that mere disbelief of a defendant's
testimony can constitute substantive proof to be "added" to
the State's case is far from universally accepted, although
the absence of a generally accepted analytical framework
renders generalization difficult." It would seem, however,
that there are distinctions which should be made with regard
to this rule which bear on its legitimacy.
It is possible to conceive of a situation, at least in the
abstract, in which no evidence of the defendant's guilt would
be available other than his own disbelieved testimony. It has
been held that in a criminal case, where the State bears a
heavier burden of proof than in a civil case, the jury's
dissatisfaction with a defendant's explanation never permits
an inference of the elements of the crime charged.2" Despite
the absence of an authoritative Constitutional pronouncement on the issue, this statement has been described as
"well-settled" by one commentator, 3 and apparently has its
genesis in a line of civil cases beginning with Cruzan v. New
York C & HR. C. in 1917.24 In that case, a brakeman alighting from a car was struck by a passing train, the engineer
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See, Chamberlain. Presumptionsas FirstAid to the DistrictAttorney 14 A.B.A. J.
287 (1928), referring to statutory presumptions.
MODEL PENAL CODE 223.6 (21 (1974), MODEL PENAL CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT #2, 94
(1954).
Note. False Statements as Substantive Evidence of Guilt, 5 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 253,
265 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, False Statements].
State v. Taylor, 422 S.W.2d 633.637 (Mo. 1968), a receiving case cited extensively in
the Russell dissent.
Morgan. The Law of Evidence 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 481, 558 (1946).
Cruzan v. New York City and H. R. Co.. 227 Mass. 594, 116 N.E. 879, 880 (1917).
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and fireman of which testified that they had not seen the
man in time to stop. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which the New York Court of Appeals overturned for
lack of evidence of negligence produced by the plaintiff."5
However, the problem of convicting a defendant solely
on the basis of his own disbelieved testimony seems unlikely
to occur. 6 It seems that cases which have held that such
unbelieved testimony may be allowed substantive force require circumstantial or direct evidence indicating the falsity
of defendant's statement, as opposed to mere disbelief based
on an unfavorable reaction to the defendant's demeanor. In
D 'Arcangelo v. Tartar,a civil case in the same jurisdiction as
Cruzan, but reaching an opposite result on a similar issue, 7
it was held that because of circumstances in the record,
"[mere disbelief" of testimony had not been given effect as
positive proof of the fact denied, 8 as prohibited by Cruzan.
Instead, the Court characterized such testimony as false, not
merely disbelieved, relying on other testimony in the case as
well as the defendants' demeanor, which the trial court felt
9
2
indicated a consciousness of guilt.

These civil cases are closely paralleled by two representative criminal cases. As noted above, State v. Taylor held
that mere jury disbelief of a defendant's testimony never
allows an inference of the elements of a crime, citing
Cruzan.0 On the other hand, a Maryland receiving case
seems to parallel D'Arcangelo. In State v. Carter,the Court
of Special Appeals held that while as a general rule disbelieved testimony is not evidence to the contrary, disbelieving
a denial of guilt may provide a basis for finding scienter.1
However, the Court went on to add that in order to find
scienter in this fashion, there must be "[sjome additional circumstances establishing the inherent improbability of defendant's denial,"3 thus relying on the same criteria as D'Arcangelo.
25. Id at 881.
26. Maguire and Vincent. Admissions Implied From Spoliation of Related Conduct 45
YALE L. J. 226, 252 (1935). The article concerns itself solely with civil cases.
27. D'Arcangelo v. Tartar, 265 Mass. 360, 164 N.E. 87, 88 (1928). The case involved a
suit against a taxicab company to recover for personal injuries caused by the
negligence of a cabdriver. The driver and owner of the cab company both denied that
the driver was operating the vehicle causing the plaintiff's injuries, the testimony at
issue.
28. Id at 88.
29. Id at 88.
30. State v. Taylor, supra note 22.
31. State v. Carter, 10 Md. 70, 267 A.2d 743, 745 (1970).
32. Id at 746.
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The Wyoming Court in Russell seems to diverge on
paths which follow the two cases to their opposite conclusions. The majority relied on something like the
D'Arcangelo-Carterposition, and found the presence of circumstances such as the disparity between the value of the
manifold and the size of loan for which it was accepted as collateral as circumstances establishing the improbability of
defendant's testimony, 3 although there is no discussion of
the substantive effect of the jury's apparent disbelief of
Russell's story. The dissent, in contrast, relied on the Cruzan
conceptualization, quoting from State v. Taylor at length. 4
It would appear, then, that the line between what would
constitute a mere disbelief of the defendant's testimony, and
what would constitute a statement the falsity of which has
been supported by other evidence in the case is not very
bright. However, such a distinction may well be crucial, as
the acceptance of false statements as the basis for an inference of guilt is well accepted in the law,36 while the idea
that a defendant's testimony, even if disbelieved, should not
absolve the state of the necessity of proving an element of
the crime charged seems equally accepted.3 6 The fact that
most courts regard false statements as a mere ground for inference which the jury may make if it so desires may reduce
the impact of the rule.37 In addition, it appears that there are
no reported cases which have relied solely on such an inference.3 8
It seems appropriate to inquire at this point into the
value of false statements as evidence, on three grounds.
First, the assumption that a false statement can be of any
value as evidence of guilt must rest on the belief that an innocent man would not lie even under pressure. 9 It is likely
that this idealistic view doesn't reflect the real possibility
33. Russell v. State, supra note 6,at 699.
34. Id. at 702-703.
35. See, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 499 (1896) (manslaughter), and Wilson v.
United States. 162 U.S. 613. 618 (18961 (murder). Both described the presence of
false exculpatory statements as a basis for an inference of guilt. See also, MCCORMica, EVIDENCE 662 (2d ed. 1972). [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
36. Russell v. State. supra note 6, at 702-703.
37. Note, False Statements, at 264-265. Cf. McCormick, at 661.
38. Note, False Statements, at 264-265.
39. See, Wilson v. United States, supra note 35, stating that false statements by the accused "are not in harmony with the great law of truth which in all its parts is constituent and harmonious." Cf FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 58-59 (1936): comparing such legal conceptions to Plato's Ideas with extensive criticism.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1979

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 14 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 12

298

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XIV

that even an innocent man in the shadow of a long prison
sentence might yield to a lack of faith in the judicial process
and attempt to better his position by resort to falsehood. 0
Second, the question arises as to precisely what element
of the crime, if any, the false statement reaches, assuming
both falsity and reliability as evidence." For example, in the
Russell case, it might fairly be inferred that the statements
by Edwards at Russell's behest, later proven false at his trial
for perjury,4 2 indicated that Russell knew the property was
stolen. However, there is no demonstrated relevance of this
evidence to prove that the defendant was aware that the
goods were stolen at the time of receipt, the missing element
of the State's case. 3 As one can readily see, the defendant's
conception of his own legal guilt may be of little value, coming as it does from a layman untrained in the law. It might
therefore be argued that the effect of an unstructured application of the false statement doctrine is to allow the defendant to "create" a crime in his own mind which is allowed to
meet legal requirements because of the permitted inference.
Third, there are few guidelines as to what constitutes
sufficient indication that a statement is false, as opposed to
merely disbelieved by the jury. In the face of direct contradictory testimony of a credible witness, such a determination is relatively easy." Likewise, if the defendant contradicts himself, it is clear that falsity can be inferred. 5 The
real difficulty lies in the situation where the defendant's
statements are unlikely, or "[w]here the truth of the
statements necessarily depends on the subjective intent of
the defendant."4 6 Courts have apparently relied on criteria
which defy analysis in this situation, such as that the jury
must be morally certain, satisfied, or merely believe in the
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

WHARTON, 1 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 268 (Anderson ed. 1955), "an innocent, though
weak and timid man, sensible that appearances are against him and duly weighing
the danger of his being detected in clandestine attempts to stifle proof, may naturally resort to this mode of averting danger." See also, McCormick at 661.
Note, False Statements, at 268.
Edwards v. State, supra note 4.
Note. False Statements, at 269.
Territory v. Truslow, 27 Haw. 109, 115. The case involved an embezzlement of stock
belonging to an estate, which the defendant had inventoried with the son of the
decedent. The issue turned on defendant's fraudulent intent, shown by his failure to
report to the son that the stock in question had been sold.
State v. Redfearn, 246 N.C. 293, 98 S.E.2d 322, 326 (1956); The question in the case
was the liability of defendant as a second degree principal in her son's murder of her
husband. The defendant made conflicting statements as to the manner of death.
Note. False Statements at 267.
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falsity of the statement. 7 One jurisdiction has developed
somewhat more meaningful criterion; in New York
"[ilndependent evidence of such fabrication" is required to
demonstrate the falsity of the evidence. 8 In Russell, the
testimony of the police officer and deputy county attorney
would certainly meet that standard.
3.

The Eagan Doctrine in Receiving Cases

A related question is that of the effect to be given the
defendant's testimony, absent direct evidence as to his
knowledge of the stolen character of the goods at the time of
receipt. In this context, the Eagan rule49 seems worthy of
consideration and comparison. In Eagan, the defendant was
convicted of murder on the basis of circumstantial evidence;
the defendant was the only surviving witness at the scene of
the crime. In reducing his conviction to manslaughter, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that when an accused is the
sole witness to a crime, his testimony must be accepted if (1)
he has not been impeached, (2) his testimony is not improbable, and (3) is not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances known, but reasonably consistent therewith.5 °
While it appears that the Eagan rule is still good law in
Wyoming, 5 ' its applicability to the receiving context appears
not to have been considered.
The English courts have confronted the relationship
between an Eagan rule and the recent possession doctrine.5 2
In the seminal case of Rex v. Schama and Abramovitch, the
English Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that when an accused is in possession of stolen goods and offers an explanation, "[ilf the jury thinks that explanation might be true,
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

Id. at 267.
People v. Russell. 266 N.Y. 147. 194 N.E. 65. 68 (1934).
Eagan v. State. 58 Wyo. 167. 128 P.2d 215 (1942.
Id. at 225. Blume. J.. characterized this rule as a modification of the principle that
juries are "ordinarily the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses."
See, Cullin v. State. 565 P.2d 445. 452 (Wyo. 1977). written by Justice Raper. the
author of the majority opinion in Russel4 holding that the rule is only appropriate
when the defendant's testimony is consistent with facts and circumstances. It
seems a fair statement that the Court has limited its application of this rule severely. See, Doe v. State. 569 P.2d 1269. 1279 (Wyo. 1977), Ragiosa v. State, 562 P.2d
1009, 1016 (Wyo. 1977). Buckles v. State. 500 P.2d 518. 521 (Wyo. 1972). State v.
Goettina. 61 Wvo. 420. 58 P.2d 865. 879 1945): all declining to apply the Eagan rule
because of contradictory evidence, either direct or based on fair inference. Cf. State
v. Helton, 73 Wyo. 92. 276 P.2d 434. 443 (1954). applying the rule to reduce a conviction of first degree murder to manslaughter based upon inadequate contradiction of
the defendant's testimony as to her mental state.
Fraser, Stolen Property: The Defense That Might Reasonably Be True, 1 U. B. C. L.
REV. 553 (1962).
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although they are not convinced that it is true, the prisoner
is entitled to an acquittal." 3 Although the rule has been interpreted as merely a restatement of the reasonable doubt
standard,5 4 the most recent major case by the same court
still requires that the jury be satisfied that the explanation
offered by the defendant of his possession of stolen property
is untrue.5 5
It seems clear that the English cases were intended to
deal with the unique problems of stolen property created by
the recent possession doctrine by requiring that the explanation of the defendant be accorded some deference, if only
that offered by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of the elements of the crime. It also seems that the
doctrine of Eagan would require some sort of application,
reconciliation, or differentiation in receiving cases in Wyoming.
CONCLUSIONS

A-rule which permits the jury to appropriate a defendant's disbelieved testimony when that defendant is pressured by the recent possession doctrine to testify, may go
too far in aiding the State unless the basis for determining falsity as well as the reliability of false statements by
particular defendants are subjected to some scrutiny by trial
courts. The problem of jury control looms large, for without
a limitation on what kinds of "false" statements may be considered substantive there is nothing to prevent a jury from
making unjustifiable inferences, once the State has made a
prima facie case in reliance upon the recent possession doctrine.5" The effect of this might be to allow the jury to negate
the element that the defendant knew that the goods he
received were stolen in virtually any receiving case.5 7
Moreover, the "stacking" of the inference permitted
from disbelieved or false statements upon that afforded by
the recent possession doctrine might well violate the due pro53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Rex v. Schama and Abramovitch. 112 L.T. 480. 482. 11 Cr. App. R. 45 (1914).
Fraser. supra note 54. at 557.
Rex v. Ayes. 2 AIJ E.R. 33011950). Note the similarity to the criteria for determining
the falsity of a defendant's testimony.
Note, False Statements, at 275.
Maguire and Vincent. supra note 26, at 257
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cess clause, as the requirement that the prosecutor prove
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt has been
held to be required by that clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5" It is true that the Barnes case 9 did

uphold the recent possession doctrine against a due process
challenge, but that decision can only be considered a narrow
one 60 and does not in any case account for the problems
related to the effect of defendant's testimony associated

with these cases. 61

A more thorough analysis of the rules applied in Russell
is necessary to assure that the defendant receives a fair trial
without fear of inadequate controls on the possible biases of
the jury or excessive shifting of the State's burden of proof.
MICHAEL A. DEAHL
58.

59.
60.
61.

In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). "We explicitly hold that the Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." A related question is whether the legislature could Constitutionally
redefine the elements of the crime so as to eliminate the requirement of guilty
knowledge, thus making receiving a strict liability crime. The only case dealing
directly with this issue is People v. Estreich. 272 App. Div. 698. 75 N.Y.S. 2d 267
(1967). aff'd 297 N.Y. 910, 79 N.E. 2d 742: in which the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court struck down a receiving statute without a knowledge or
reasonable inquiry requirement. relying on the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause. United States Supreme Court cases considering this general problem have
looked to whether the violation is an act or omission: whether the offense was a common law crime which would allow an inference of the knowledge requirement, thus
avoiding a Constitutional issue; whether the nature of defendant's conduct, as of a
business, is such as to make it fair to punish without knowledge: and of course the
severity of the penalty, the most important consideration. LaFave and Scott.
144-146: 218-223. Note the Court's remarks in Powell v. Texas. 392 U.S. 514, 535
(1968),
the doctrines of actus reus, mens rea. insanity, mistake, justification, and
duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and
changing religious, moral, and medical views of the nature of man,
and those in Morrisette v. United States 342 U.S. 246. 260 (1951). that
neither this Court. nor. so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to
delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for
distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes
that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is
neither settled nor static.
See also, Hart. The Aims of the CriminalLaw.23 J. OF LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa.
401. 431 (1938). on the role of personal guilt in punishment, as well as the Supreme
Court's failure to address the Constitutional requirements for punishment: and
Sayre. Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932). advocating a fluid mens rea concept
like that reflected in the above passages.
Barnes v. United States, supra note 12.
Note. Due Process Requirements for Use of Non-Statutory Inferences in Criminal
Cases - Barnes v. United States, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 897.906 (1973).
The required relationship between a fact proven and one inferred therefrom to
satisfy the due process clause is the subject of a line of cases considered in Barnes.
These were United States v. Gainey. 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (there must be a rational
relationship between the fact proven and that presumed): Leary v. United States
395 U.S. 6 (1969) (the presumed fact must be more likely than not to flow from the
fact proven): Turner v. United States 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (question of which standard is correct reservedl. See also. McCormick. at 831-832. for an analysis of these
cases.
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